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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEIL.A. R. BROWN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-\S.-
THO}LA.S E. BROWN, 
Defendant and Appell{liYI;t. 
Brief of Appellant 
THE FACTS 
This is an action for divorce, in which the original 
decree was entered on Jlrn.e 27, 1947. In that decree 
defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff $15.00 per 
week for the support and maintenance of two minor 
children. (R. 2.) On August 25, 1949, pursuant to a 
stipulation of the parties, the court entered an order 
decreeing that the defendant had on that day paid 
plaintiff $500.00, which constituted payment in full for 
all judgments of the court theretofore entered, and that 
the defendant was not obligated to plaintiff in any 
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amount except for the monthly payments thereafter to 
accrue under said order. It was further ordered that 
the decree entered June 27, 194 7, as modified by the 
order dated January 6, 1949, be further modified so as 
to require the defendant to pay the sum of $40.00 per 
month (rather than $60.00) in two installments of 
$20.00 each payable on the first and fifteenth of the 
month commencing September 1, 1949. (R. 16-18.) This 
order, so modifying the decree, further provides as fol-
lows, in paragraph 4: 
"It is further ordered that in the event the de-
fendant shall default in the payment of the sum 
of $40.00 per month as herein provided, and shall 
remain in default for a period of thirty days, then 
the provision of the decree heretofore entered 
requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $60.00 per month for the care and 
support of the two minor children of the parties 
shall be automatically reinstated." (R. 19.) 
Pursuant to the order of the court, the defendant 
paid $20.00 on September 1, 1949, $20.00 on September 
15, 1949, $20.00 on October 30, 1949, and $20.00 on No-
vember 7, 1949. (R. 42.) The defendant was delinquent 
at the time of the hearing in the amount of $20.00, rep-
resenting the payment due November 1, 1949. (R. 41-42.) 
Counsel for plaintiff pressed the issue of contempt 
and in exoneration of such charge the defendant testi-
fied that he 'vas self -employed and was engaged in the 
servicing of refrigerators and household appliances; 
that he had no regular date upon which he received any 
Income; that he didn't make the payments on October 
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1st and 15th because he did not have sufficient money; 
that during the month of October he made about $110.00; 
that aside from the payment of $20.00 which he made to 
the plaintiff on October 30th, he paid for groceries for 
his family and boug·ht himself a pair of work shoes; that 
he "Tas married: that he did not spend any part of his 
income on drink or entertainment; (R. 45-46) that from 
Xovember 1st to the date of the hearing he earned about 
$100.00, out of 'Yhich he paid $20.00 to plaintiff on No-
vember 7th; that he also spent some of his income on 
food, phone and lights; that he needs a telephone to 
operate his business. He expected to have a check on 
the following day that would enable him to make the 
payment that was due November 1st; that he borrowed 
the money to pay the $500.00 settlement in August and 
h~ was under obligation to pay that money back at 5 per 
cent interest, the payments being $15.00 per month, but 
that he had not made any payments on that loan. (R. 46-
47.) During the previous month when he made the pay-
ments as ordered, defendant earned about $175.00. There 
are five members in his present household, (his wife and 
her three children) and his food expense runs about 
$20.00 per week; that out of the money earned in Sep-
tember he paid $10.00 in repairs to his car, which is 
essential to the earrying on of his business. During 
September he also bought $15.00 worth of hand tools, 
which he used in his business; that he didn't spend any 
money in September on liquor; that during the month 
of September he went to two or three shows, and spent 
about $20.00 on some delinquent bills that were incurred 
prior to the divorce. (R. 48-49.) The car he operates is 
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a 1937 Packard, which belongs to his present wife. (R. 
53.) The defendant testified that he had written a letter 
inquiring about a job, and that he would accept such 
work if he could obtain it, provided it was more profit-
able than his present work. 
Upon these facts, which were uncontradicted, the 
District Court found and adjudged the defendant to be 
in contempt of court for the non payment of the $20.00 
delinquency, and the court in its decree reinstated the 
terms of the earlier decree and modified the order 
entered on August 25, 1949, to the extent that the de-
fendant was ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of $60.00 
a month in two semi-monthly installments commencing 
December 1, 1949. (R. 29-30.) The court further ordered 
the defendant to pay $50.00 to the plaintiff for her attor-
ney fee. The defendant requested a stay of execution 
for a couple of weeks to enable him to·. pay the delin-
quency, but the motion was denied. (R. 57.) Thereupon 
the committment was issued and the defendant was con-
fined in the County Jail,· from which he was liberated 
upon the filing of a notice of appeal and bond. ( R. 33-37.) 
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POINT.S UPON ''rHICH APPELLANT RELIES 
FOR REVERSAI.J OF JUDGl\1ENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND AND 
ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE 
ORDER ENTERED AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING 
THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DE-




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND AND 
ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
It is true that the defendant did not strictly comply 
with the District Court order entered August 25, 1949, 
in that he failed to make the payments in October and 
November at the times on which such payments fell due 
and he was delinquent in the sum of $20.00 at the time 
of the hearing. It is well established, however, that a 
mere failure to strictly comply with the order of the 
court does not constitute a civil contempt unless such 
non-compliance was deliberate, willful or contumacious . 
• 
Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, 68 Utah 220, 
249 P. (2d) 806, and the cases therein cited. Parish v. 
Ll1cConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P. (2d) 1001. 
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There is nothing in the record which supports the 
court's finding that the defendant willfully failed to 
comply with its order, nor is there evidence in the record 
to support the court's finding that the defendant was 
then capable of complying with the order. The defend-
ant had demonstrated his good faith by borrowing 
$500.00 from his father to pay on the delinquent account 
incurred prior to the order of August 25, 1949, and he 
had made the payments requested by that order on Sep-
tember 1st and 15th. Ilaving earned only about $110.00 
in October, he was unable to make the payments as they 
fell due during that month. With a wife and three 
children sitting at his table, with utility bills to be paid, 
with an irregular income amounting to $110.00, it is in-
conceivable to us that the court could find evidence in 
the record to support its finding that the defendant will-
fully, contemptuously and deliberately disregarded its 
order. Although in legal contemplation the first duty 
of defendant was to support the two children by his 
first marriage, the needs of the present members of his 
household could not altogether be disregarded. There 
is nothing contemptuous or willful in the diversion of 
portions of defendant's income for the feeding of the 
hungry mouths that surround his present table; and if 
the needs of the first household and second household 
were to be compared, certainly the $500.00 paid in 
August and the $40.00 paid in September would insure 
against any suffering on the part of the plaintiff and the 
two children in her custody. The record discloses no 
misuse of the defendant's income during the period in 
controversy. The expenditure of $10.00 to keep the 
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automobile running, of $15.00 for tools used in his work, 
and the purrhase of a pair of shoes for the defendant, 
can not be regarded as other than requisite. There was 
no 'Yaste or squandering of income on drink, clothing, 
traYel, luxuries, gambling or entertainment. Even the 
$3.00 spent during the t"To-month period for entertain-
ment vras spent during the month of September, when 
the defendant had sufficient income to comply with the 
court's order. In Yiew of the defendant's limited in-
come, it is nothing short of miraculous that he could 
arrive at the date of the hearing with just a $20.00 de-
linquency. \Ve do not know what more the defendant 
could have done that he failed to do in the equitable 
distribution of his limited wealth, nor can we perceive 
in what manner his ability to comply with the court's 
order with respect to the delinquency and with respect 
to future payments could be enhanced by a ten-day sen-
tence in the County Jail, accompanied by awards of 
attorney's fees and court costs. The punishment the 
District Court inflicted upon the defendant, if approved 
by this court, will add and not detract from the suffer-
ings of the children in the two households defendant is 
required by law to maintain. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE ORDER 
ENTERED AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING 
THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949. 
No new circumstances were either pleaded or proved 
in this matter and the sole authority for the court to 
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modify its decree must find basis in the interpretation 
of paragraph 4 of the decree as applied to the facts of 
this case. As we read it, the decree provides that in the 
event the defendant shall be in default to the extent of 
$40.00 and shall remain in default to that extent for a 
period of thirty days, then the provisions of the earlier 
·order requiring the payment of $60.00 per month could 
be automatically reinstated. There is no ambiguity in 
the provision, and we do not believe it to be fairly sus-
ceptible to any other interpretation. Aside from that, 
the defendant was never in default in any amount for a 
period of thirty days. The payment due October 1st 
was made October 30th, the payment due October 15th 
was made November 7th. The only payment remaining 
due at the time of the hearing was the one which accrued 
on November 1st. The longest period of delinquency 
was in October when the $20.00 delinquency existed for 
twenty nine days and there was a $40.00 delinquency for 
a· period of fifteen' days. At the time of the hearing the 
defendant was delinquent in the amount of $20.00 for a 
period of fourteen days. 
It is a well-established principle of law that where 
a debtor makes payments on a running account and 
neither he nor his creditor makes a particular applica-
tion of such payments, the law will apply them to the 
.first items in the debt. Naidech v. Hempfling, (New Jer-
sey) 24 Atl. (2d) 524; Birkhauser v. Ross, (California) 
283 Pac. 866; Radichel v. Federal Surety Company, 
(Minn.) 212 N.W. 171; State ex rel. Spillman v. Security 
· State Bank of Eddyville, (N ebra.ska) 218 N.W. 407; March 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v. B~ttler, (South Dakota) 220 N.W. 461. In the case at 
bar neither the plaintiff nor the defendant indicated 
that portion of the support account to which the pay-
ments made on October 30th and November 7th were to 
be applied. Under the authorities above cited, it is clear 
that the October 30th payment should be applied by the 
court to the amount due October 1st and the November 
7th payment should be applied by the court to the 
amount which fell due October 15th. The conclusion is, 
therefore, inescapable that the defendant wa.s never in 
default in any amount for a period of thirty days, an~ 
the court, therefore, erred in reinstating the terms of 
the earlier decree in violation of the provisions of the 
stipulation and decree entered on August 25, 1949. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT 
TO PAY PLAINTIFF A $50.00 COUNSEL FEE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
This case has another unfortunate aspect, in that 
the circumstances of the defendant are not such that he 
is able to support and maintain two households and in 
addition to that an attorney who deems a $20.00 default 
of sufficient moment to warrant the institution of con-
tempt proceedings-and this within two months after 
his client has been paid $500.00 by the defendant, who 
had to borrow from his father in order to make such sum 
available to the plaintiff. Was her need and the need 
of the children so desperate that the defendant must be 
hailed into court without being given the courtesy of a 
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letter warning him of the dire consequences that would 
follow his monumental default~ Although it is conceded 
that ordinarily the sum of $50.00 is of minimum reason-
ableness in connection with the prosecution of a hearing 
on· an order to show cause to enforce compliance with 
a support decree, yet whether or not the defendant 
should be required to pay such fee is a matter within 
the so.und discretion of the court. Obviously, with the 
$500.00 which she had received August 25, 1949, and the 
$80.00 that she had been paid thereafter, the plaintiff 
was in a much better position than the defendant to 
defray her own legal expense. We earnestly submit that 
it was a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
District Court to allow a $50.00 attorney's fee for the 
collection of a $20.00 delinquency under the circum-
stances of this case. Certainly the practice of instituting 
a contempt proceeding for a $20.00 delinquency with 
attendant claims for counsel fees and court costs should 
not be encouraged. It would seem that our courts have 
sufficient litigation before them without such improvi-
dent enlistment of their facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judg-
ment of the district court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
WOODROW D~ WHITE 
ALLAN E. MECHAM 
.Attorneys for .Appellant. 
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